

MR Book Reviews

The Military Balance in the Middle East, Anthony H. Cordesman, Praeger, Westport, CT, 2004, 560 pages, \$55.00.

Anthony H. Cordesman's *The Military Balance in the Middle East* is a useful, readable reference that presents a factual layout of the quantitative and qualitative trends in the military balance from the most heavily armed region of the world. Cordesman's data comes from unclassified sources of regional and U.S. governments, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, *Jane's*, and the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies. He uses U.S. data to back up or refute data that host nations or other sources provided.

Cordesman is a prolific writer, with more than 20 publications on the Middle East. In this book, he includes sections on Arab-Israeli states, northern and southern Gulf nations, terrorist and extremist movements, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He provides the reader with a good knowledge base on which to build expertise in a specific country or subregion. Given the ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other potential flashpoints (Syria and Iran), the chapters on terrorist and extremist movements and proliferation of WMD are the most useful to military readers. Serious students of the Middle East should have this reference.

**LTC John E. Taylor, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS IN DESERT STORM: From Planning to Victory, Lane Toomey, Hellgate Press, Central Point, OR, 2004, 626 pages, \$24.00.

Lane Toomey, a former XVIII Airborne Corps staff planner, provides an operational-tactical look at the XVIII Airborne Corps through its deployments, operations, and redeployments. The lessons learned in this book are legion and provide outstanding examples of how initiative and innovation make the U.S. military great. Toomey's research and numerous personal interviews provide a fascinating look into how

the U.S. Army prepares for war from a standing start.

Toomey describes how the Army ran into what Carl von Clausewitz called the friction of war. Seemingly significant problems were solved by smart, dedicated staff officers. Some of the solutions are downright fascinating and are not found in any doctrinal texts. They speak volumes about the intelligence and initiative of numerous officers working on staffs from battalion to corps.

Toomey's story is not sugar-coated. He is critical of bureaucrats, "shammers," and the incompetent, especially those who did not share the hazards and discomfort of frontline units—the "pogues" who inhabited rear areas, and ate Class A rations, and outfitted themselves with uniforms and equipment intended for combat Soldiers.

The book's joint and combined lessons learned run the gamut from host-nation support issues such as Muslim-Arab cultural differences to U.S. Air Force-Army cultural differences to French-U.S. cultural differences. Each issue presents its unique challenges with some of the same concerns that affect today's operations; in particular, a lack of communication bandwidth, which garnered Toomey's harsh criticism of Central Command.

XVIII Airborne Corps In Desert Storm is detailed, professionally insightful, interesting, and, at times, humorous. I highly recommend this two-thumbs-up book.

**LTC Edwin L. Kennedy, USA,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas**

JOURNEY INTO DARKNESS: Genocide In Rwanda, Thomas Odom, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2005, 312 pages, \$59.95.

Journey into Darkness is Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Odom's personal account of the horror that resulted from the Rwandan genocide. The book provides unique insight into a multicultural and multinational environment and the associated high-level politics that surround intense

events such as genocide.

Odom describes the amalgam of culture and politics that resulted in the genocide and that continue to impel killing and instability in the region. Odom's story is so vivid the reader can easily picture the events and feel the frustration resulting from the milieu of miscommunication, distance, culture, preconceived notions, and personal agendas. Despite these overwhelming odds, Odom is able to establish a working relationship with the U.S. community, nongovernmental entities, and the UN.

Although Odom's book centers around Rwanda, his account of the culture, the military, and the Goma refugee situation in Zaire provides an excellent background for the entire crisis. Odom's not being accepted as an official defense attaché (DAT) in Zaire, for example, immediately sets the tone for the book. When Colonel (later Brigadier General) Loleki, former Zairean defense attaché in Washington, departs the United States with a \$50 thousand debt and 5 luxury cars, the U.S. Department of State refuses to grant a visa to his replacement until Zaire pays the debt.

Loleki later bribed his way to brigadier and to director of the foreign liaison, which put him in a position to retaliate—and he decided to not accept Odom as an accredited defense attaché. Although Odom was not formally recognized as a DAT, he was permitted to stay in country. The implication of his unofficial status was that Odom was not allowed inside the Ministry of Defense Headquarters. Nevertheless, he developed a patrolling routine and network that proved valuable in reporting information about Les Forces Armées Zairoise and the general climate of the country.

Being set against the depressing backdrop of pervasive death makes Odom's account all the more compelling. His involvement in the prevention of genocide began in July 1994 when Rwandan refugees were crossing the border of Southeastern Zaire into the city of Goma, where he was sent to lead the U.S. Embassy

team. More than 750,000 Rwandan refugees had gathered in Goma, and an outbreak of cholera began to spread. By late July, 6,700 people were dying each day from cholera. In a daily report to the Pentagon, Odom consistently emphasized the need for water purification equipment.

Some interesting aspects of the book include Odom's relationship with the French Military and non-governmental organizations; the honing of his diplomatic skills; and his success in establishing liaison and working relationships with the U.S. joint task force that would ultimately conduct Operation Support Hope.

Odom's commitment to the profession of arms, his superb performance under fire, and his expertise as a foreign area officer are manifested in this book, which serves as a tribute to him and those like him who labor quietly, as unique amalgams of Soldier and diplomat, in far-flung corners of the earth.

LTG James R. Clapper, USAF, Retired, Fairfax, Virginia

THE RED SEA TERROR TRIANGLE: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and Islamic Terror, Shaul Shay, Rachel Liberman, trans., Transaction Publishers, Piscataway, NJ, 2005, 201 pages, \$39.95.

In *The Red Sea Terror Triangle*, Shaul Shay examines the triangle of countries he considers potential targets in the War on Terrorism—Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen. Shay, a counterterrorism research fellow, is head of the history department of the Israeli Defense Forces. However, this book, like many translated works, is challenging to read because of idiosyncratic sentence structure and word choice.

Shay reviews each country's history, its role in Islam, its problems with postcolonial political stability, and its role in terrorist organizations. The majority of the population in all three countries is Muslim; all three gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s (with the colonial experience leaving a distinct mark on each); and all three countries have had unstable political systems marked by internal and external conflicts. (Even when temporary stability was achieved, it was always by a tyrannical government.) Terrorist organizations took root in all

three countries, but assumed different roles.

Shay discusses the problem of failed states and ungovernable regions, recognizing the value of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" (*Foreign Affairs*, New York, 1993). He sees a conflict between nomadic and state-oriented cultures and believes that a war against a nomadic culture must be prosecuted differently from a war against a state-oriented culture. Shay thinks that the Global War on Terrorism construct addresses only a limited conceptual aspect of the deeper cultural conflict. He offers that Al Qaeda is a merging of radical Islam and nomadic cultures. Finally, he discusses the need to rehabilitate failing states.

This interesting book offers a glimpse into a corner of the world as well as useful insight into the problems with failing states and what is needed to rehabilitate them.

LTC Christopher E. Bailey, USAR, Charlottesville, Virginia

FORREST: The Confederacy's Relentless Warrior, Robert M. Browning, Jr., Brassey's, Inc., Dulles, VA, 2004, 129 pages, \$19.95.

Forrest: The Confederacy's Relentless Warrior, a short historical biography from Brassey's Military Profiles series, highlights the lives of significant historic and current military personalities in an effort to stimulate a deeper interest in military history.

Straightforward and easy to read, *Forrest* essentially remains at the tactical level, potentially making it a professional-development vehicle for officers and noncommissioned officers at the company level.

Forrest was a good warrior and excellent tactician. During the Meridian Campaign, he exhibited a valued warrior ethic when he led a newly organized and poorly armed force (just over one-third the size of opponent General William Sooy Smith's Union forces) on an unrelenting 50-mile pursuit to a crushing victory, even though his troops were exhausted.

In June 1864, at the Battle of Brice's Cross Roads in Mississippi, Forrest fought and vanquished a Union force nearly three times the strength of his own forces. His vic-

tory changed the North's strategy because his actions diverted Major General Andrew J. Smith's troops from Mobile to Memphis.

Forrest's victories are marked by his use of cunning ruses to lead his outnumbered forces to victory. It was said that he was "best in pursuit, and he did not relent." Robert Selph Henry's *First with the Most* (Mallard Press, New York, 1991) describes Forrest's warrior ethos at Brice's Cross Roads: "[Forrest] rode with his saber in hand, sleeves rolled up, his coat lying on the pommel of his saddle, looking like the God of War." He exuded the warrior ethos; he was tough, steadfast, resilient, and ruthless.

Forrest never surrendered, was relentless in pursuit of fleeing foes, and as the book reveals, was at times just outright mean. The book avoids any moral judgment on the wrongness or rightness of the Confederate cause, but Brown does devote a chapter to Forrest's immediate post-Civil War role as a leader of the fledgling Ku Klux Klan. In fact, Brown's account seems to have as its purpose the exculpation of Forrest in the subsequent heinous acts of that organization's membership. The book's glaring shortcoming is that nowhere is it critical of Forrest.

LTC Robert M. Cassidy, USA, Kuwait

THROUGH THE CROSSHAIRS: A History of Snipers, Andy Dougan, Carroll & Graf, New York, 2005, 320 pages, \$26.00.

Warfare in the 21st century is characterized more and more by its precision, lethality, and unconventional nature. The military sniper incorporates these qualities in his battlefield function and is perhaps the model warrior for this age.

Andy Dougan's book *Through the Crosshairs: A History of Snipers* begins with the development of missile weapons in prehistoric times, which ultimately led to firearms and to the creation of the light infantry sharpshooter.

One original aspect of the book is Dougan's discussion of the sniper's image in military society. On one side we find him as an antihero, loathed by his normal infantry comrades as almost a murderer and perceived as "not playing fair." Yet, when properly employed, he often

saves the lives of his condemning brothers-in-arms.

On the other side, there is an idealized view of him as a solitary figure amidst the mass carnage of war. His battle is that of the single marksman against his victim. The sniper provides a brutal poetry within the chaos of the battlefield: one shot, one kill. The reality probably lies somewhere between these extremes.

Dougan uses Ernest Hemingway's style: his prose is direct, easy to read, and noncomplex, but it lacks foreign-language sources on snipers. Dougan focuses primarily on the British and American experience and refers to Russian sniper tradition only through a few English-language sources. A true history of snipers would certainly have delved into primary and secondary sources from the German, Russian, Israeli, and possibly French militaries. Another source might have been Bruno Sutkus's *Im Fadenkreuz—Tagebuch eines Scharfschützen* (Munin Verlag, Germany, 2004), the diary of a German sniper during World War I.

Another critique is that Dougan covers the early history of sniping, but does not mention the development of new arms, such as the .50-caliber rifles that have become a mainstay in sniper circles. The book is clearly not a gun digest, but technology plays such an important role in sniper evolution that this subject could have at least been covered in an appendix.

I strongly recommend this book to readers with an interest in military history and military art. Snipers have proven their worth in recent counterinsurgency conflicts—Vietnam, Somalia, and Afghanistan—and are an important battlefield feature to understand for future conflicts.

**Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D.,
Switzerland**

AT WAR'S END: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, Roland Paris, The University of Cambridge Press, New York, 2004, 289 pages, \$65.00.

Since the early 1990s, the international community has become increasingly involved in efforts to rebuild states that have been torn by war and violent conflict. The UN alone is engaged in more than 10 political and peace-building missions around the world, building on a

record that has included postconflict reconstruction efforts from Cambodia to Guatemala to Mozambique.

With massive operations underway in Afghanistan and Iraq, peace-building represents a major global growth industry. Yet how much do we really know about its effectiveness in reducing conflict and supporting postconflict reconstruction? Roland Paris questions whether the predominant models of peacekeeping, with their emphasis on rapid democratization and market liberalization, are appropriate in fragile postconflict contexts.

Paris challenges the peace theory—a central principle of President Woodrow Wilson's foreign policy—that democracies do not attack democracies and, through the spread of democracy, promote peace in domestic and international affairs. Policymakers past and present believe that democracy contributes to safety and prosperity. One of the central tenets of President Bill Clinton's foreign policy was that liberal democracies and market-oriented economies are less prone to internal violence because market democracies are less hostile in their international affairs.

Paris asks key questions: Are liberal democracies especially peaceful in their international relations or domestic politics? Will efforts to promote market democracy truly enhance domestic and international peace? Roland also focuses on central governments' viability and willingness to transition to a market democracy. Case studies in Angola, Rwanda, Cambodia, Liberia, Bosnia, Croatia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia, and Mozambique provide a foundation for Roland's challenges and also provide a capability to translate them to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Last, Roland offers compelling arguments for identifying and rebuilding key institutions before rushing into democratic and market reforms. Peace-builders should seek to transform war-shattered states into liberal market democracies, but with a different technique: by constructing the foundations of effective political and economic institutions before introducing electoral and market-oriented adjustment policies.

**LTC Mark Barkley, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

COLOSSUS REBORN: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943, David M. Glantz, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2005, 807 pages, \$39.95.

Colossus Reborn is about the successful transformation of an Army at war. This second volume in a trilogy about the Red Army that covers the period 1941 to 1943 is detailed and thought-provoking.

David M. Glantz's first book, *Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War* (University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1998), analyzed the Red Army on the brink of World War II. This volume includes the disastrous defeats at the hands of the Wehrmacht in 1941 and 1942 and the subsequent and extraordinary victories of the Red Army in Stalingrad in 1942 and Kursk in 1943.

Newly won victories at Stalingrad and Kursk resulted from the Red Army's ability to adapt quickly and transform its army of millions into an effective fighting force. So, considering Stalin's brutal purges of the Red Army's leadership and subsequent near destruction by Nazi Germany, how did this transformation occur? Glantz writes a comprehensive history of the Red Army at its defining moment using Red Army veterans' interviews and newly released archival materials from Russia.

The book includes many little-known but highly significant battles fought during the first 30 months of the war. Glantz examines other historians' views of these battles and explains his analysis with candid conclusions. He also examines the Red Army's immense force structure and its administration, education, and training and describes how the Army transformed itself, highlighting the efforts of the men who led the Army's transformation from a disorganized, ineffective, and demoralized force to a powerful offensive machine capable of smashing a seemingly unstoppable German juggernaut.

**LTC Scott A. Porter, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE POLISH UNDERGROUND ARMY, THE WESTERN ALLIES, AND THE FAILURE OF STRATEGIC UNITY IN WORLD WAR II, Michael Alfred Peszke, McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, NC, 2005, 244 pages, \$45.00.

A discussion of Polish military involvement in World War II usually brings to mind Germany's lightning campaign of 1939 or Polish General Stanislaw Sosabowski's paratroopers' role in Operation Market-Garden. In *The Polish Underground Army, the Western Allies, and the Failure of Strategic Unity in World War II*, Michael A. Peszke evaluates Poland's integration into and contribution to the Allied strategic effort. He examines national strategies and how exiled Polish leaders labored for years to assimilate themselves favorably into the Allied war effort. With the establishment of a communist government in Poland under Soviet authority, however, and despite the exertion and sacrifice of thousands of Poles, the labor was in vain.

Peszke asserts that at the beginning of the war the Polish cause was far from hopeless. But, in 1943, the "year of ever-increasing disasters," the fortunes of Western Poles declined precipitously. The reasons for this are numerous, but Peszke places most of the blame on Britain and France's fickle policies, the media, anti-Polish/pro-Russian sentiment, a victorious and occupying Soviet Union, and pure bad luck.

Peszke's book is primarily concerned with Great Power politics and seldom do individual actions enter the narrative, except to underscore strategic arguments. Because of this high-level focus, Peszke's work can be dense and difficult to read given the myriad participants and agendas the reader must grasp. Within this body of work, however, Peszke contributes a great deal of information and solid analysis.

Peszke's approach is chronological and sound, and his arguments are convincing. He is an emotional writer, and one can distinctly feel his personal lament for vanquished Polish hopes. The book is a solid and worthwhile evaluation of Polish involvement in World War II at the strategic level that offers the reader new insight into the relationship of Poland and its allies.

**LTC Michael A. Boden, USA,
Hohenfels, Germany**

A NATION OF VILLAGES: Riot and Rebellion in the Mexican Huasteca, 1750-1850, Michael T. Ducey, The University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 2005, 230 pages, \$39.95.

This book is the result of Michael T. Ducey's dissertation research. As such, it offers a wealth of detail on the obscure topic of Mexican peasant rebellions of the late colonial and early national periods. Specifically, it is a study of the various social upheavals that occurred in the south-central region known as the Huasteca, bordering the Gulf of Mexico. This region encompassed portions of four modern Mexican states, where impoverished Indian groups lived in small, dispersed villages surrounded by rugged hills, jungle, and small farm plots.

Military conflict, as such, is not the main subject of the book. The emphasis is on the underlying socioeconomic causes of these rebellions and their effects on Mexican political and social history. The book does not cover tactical or operational issues; it inspects the roots of social conflict and the country's transition from colonial status to fledgling federalist democracy.

The issues Ducey raises are definitely worth consideration by military officers, particularly those working on civil-military issues. Latin American foreign area officers and others dealing with the region will gain a deeper perspective into the area's history of rural, local government (*la patria chica* or the "small Motherland") versus the concerns of the governing elite in a distant capital. The self-perception of individuals as citizens rather than subjects of a king or members of a particular tribe or village is an essential element of emerging concepts of nationhood and democracy. The patterns of rebellion and accommodation between rural villages and the central government are as evident today in Mexico and Latin America as they were in the period covered by Ducey.

As with many works of its type, the book has the strengths and weaknesses of academic work in a narrow field. Ducey has done careful research in obscure archives and supports his conclusions with an extensive scholarly apparatus. However, the book is rather dry in style and uses some postmodernist jargon.

A Nation of Villages provides useful perspectives for students of current American interventions in developing countries. When contemplating Afghanistan and Africa today, it is sobering to remember that Mexico had 49 national administrations in the first 33 years of republic-

can rule, demonstrating how fragile and, at the same time, how powerful, the idea of democracy can be and the sometimes tortuous route it takes to implant itself in the consciousness of a people, especially those living in small, isolated villages with histories of colonial exploitation.

**MAJ Prisco R. Hernández, USA,
Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism, Stephen Flynn, HarperCollins, New York, 2004, 178 pages, \$13.95.

If there is a counterterrorism lesson to be learned from the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina, it is the importance of consequence management as an integral part of our homeland security strategy. We must be prepared to deal with catastrophes, whatever their origin.

A year before Katrina and several years post-9/11, Stephen E. Flynn addressed this issue and many others in *America the Vulnerable: How our Government is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism*. Flynn, a retired U.S. Coast Guard officer who served in both Democratic and Republican administrations, is now a senior fellow in national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

In the chapter "The Next Attack," Flynn offers a series of hypothetical, but alarmingly feasible, terrorist actions that culminate in the detonation of a dirty bomb from inside a shipping container at a U.S. port. This detonation leaves the president with an unenviable choice: to inspect every incoming container, thus crippling the national economy, or reopen the national transportation network and hope there are no more bombs.

From this setup, Flynn argues that our government is failing to protect us from terrorism. To achieve effective homeland security in a resource-constrained world, he believes we must construct layers of security programs, including a capability to manage the effects of an unforeseen catastrophe. No single layer will offer ironclad protection, but in total they provide an effective deterrent. Flynn argues that a terrorist organization will "stake out [its] target, and if [it discovers that] the risk of detection is reasonably high or that the damage from a successful attack can be quickly contained, [the terrorists]

will likely go back to the drawing board.”

Flynn goes beyond academic debate and offers actionable recommendations. He advocates using transponder technology to locate, track, and determine the disposition of incoming containers. With this technology, we could also determine if someone had opened, altered, or otherwise tampered with a container at any point during its transit.

Flynn recommends the use of incentives and disincentives at our largest port facilities to focus our security inspections. His “red lane/green lane” concept would create a system for incoming cargo ships similar to the EZ-Pass [electronic toll road collection system]. Shippers who are trusted, verified, and regularly inspected would rate speedy processing at our busiest ports; others would have to wait their turn. Flynn also believes we should create a Federal Security Reserve System to oversee the establishment of consequence-management guidelines and to monitor compliance with water, food, energy, transportation, and other security mandates. Are Flynn’s recommendations perfect? Probably not, but they are actionable and his arguments are persuasive.

Flynn’s short, well-written, easy-to-read book is an effective guide that advances the homeland security debate. It should be on the shelf of any security scholar or practitioner.

**MAJ Jim Craig, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE SWORD OF LINCOLN: The Army of the Potomac, Jeffry D. Wert, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2005, 559 pages, \$30.00.

Jeffry D. Wert’s *The Sword of Lincoln: The Army of the Potomac* is the first book in many years to address the plight of the Army whose mission it was to protect Washington, D.C., during the Civil War while actively conducting combat operations. Despite a succession of lost battles and failed Army commanders (Generals George B. McClellan, Ambrose Burnside, and Joseph Hooker), the Army of the Potomac was able to succeed in both missions as well as accept the surrender of General Robert E. Lee at Appomattox.

Under General Ulysses S. Grant’s guidance, General George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac kept pushing

and never let up. The complexity of a two-mission Army was almost overwhelming for the Army of the Potomac, but Meade finally defeated Lee at Gettysburg, a battle that was the turning point for the Union and for the Army of the Potomac.

Wert’s research has uncovered minute details about the Army of the Potomac that are omitted in most history books, and he uses myriad references for his research. I recommend the book.

**Paul L. Hulse,
Columbus, Georgia**

NO HOLDING BACK, Brian A. Reid, Robin Brass Studio, Inc., Toronto, 2005, 491 pages, \$37.50.

Brian A. Reid’s *No Holding Back* is an in-depth study of Canada’s Operation Totalize, the first major operation conducted by the First Canadian Army during the Normandy Campaign. The operation’s execution sparked great debate among historians, to which Reid adds his voice.

Reid provides the reader with a complete understanding of the Canadian Army before Operation Totalize, chronicling changes in weapons, equipment, organization, and training. He analyzes the Canadian Army’s capabilities, limitations, and shortfalls, placing particular emphasis on the leaders.

Reid moves effortlessly from the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, which helps the reader better understand how events contributed to higher level objectives. Using well-grounded arguments, he compliments and criticizes leaders and their decisions.

The book’s strengths include the quantity and quality of its maps, illustrations, tables, and photographs, as well as dozens of pencil sketches of vehicles and fighting formations. It is a difficult challenge to add to the vast inventory of books about the Normandy Invasion, but Reid has met that challenge with *No Holding Back*. His analysis and opinions will persuade you to think.

**LTC Rick Baillergeon, USA,
Retired, Lansing, Kansas**

SEMMEs: REBEL RAIDER, John M. Taylor, Potomac Books, Dulles, VA, 2005, 124 pages, \$19.95.

John Taylor, son of General Maxwell Taylor, has written a delightful short biography about one of the most successful Confederate commerce raiders, Admiral Raphael Semmes. Semmes, although a Marylander, adopted Alabama as his home state. When Alabama seceded, Semmes resigned his commission with the U.S. Navy and reported for duty with the newly selected Confederate president.

Semmes quickly outfitted a commerce raider, the CSS *Sumter*, and headed to the Caribbean. Following the custom of the time, he did not destroy the captured vessels, but took them to a neutral port to ransom them back to their owners. The ransoms were never honored, so the captured vessels were destroyed. After capturing 18 U.S. vessels, the *Sumter* put into port at Gibraltar for repairs and never sailed again.

Semmes took command of the British-built ship CSS *Alabama*, and from August 1862 to June 1864 captured or destroyed 64 U.S. commercial vessels. He took the ship to Cherbourg, France, for repairs, where he foolishly sailed out to meet John Winslow, a former comrade from the U.S. Navy and master of the USS *Kearsarge*. Winslow engaged Semmes in battle and Semmes was defeated. Semmes returned to the South and was promoted to brigadier general, the only officer in the war to hold flag rank in two services.

Taylor’s portrait of Semmes is not entirely favorable. After Semmes’ defeat by Winslow he insisted that he had been cheated by Winslow’s somehow putting protective chains around the *Kearsarge*’s engine. Taylor rightly observes that this seems petty.

The book does not deal much with Semmes’ politics, which were, even after the war, deeply and consistently pro-Confederate. Still, Taylor tells Semmes’ story briefly but well.

**LTC D. Jonathan White, USA,
Oxfordshire, England**

FEVER OF WAR: The Influenza Epidemic in the U.S. Army during World War I, Carol R. Byerly, New York University Press, 2005, 250 pages, \$21.00.

Until the middle of the 20th century, microbes and viruses proved to be far deadlier to Soldiers than

bullets, bayonets, or shells. In *Fever of War*, Carol R. Byerly examines how the influenza pandemic of 1918 affected the U.S. Army and its operations during World War I. Byerly argues that the inept handling of the epidemic by medical officers and senior military leaders not only unnecessarily exposed thousands of American Soldiers to the disease but, consequently, hindered the overall effectiveness of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF).

Hubristic faith in medical science initially led Army doctors to downplay the seriousness of the influenza outbreak. As crowded training camps, troop ships, and frontline trenches allowed the virulent strain of influenza to spread rapidly through the ranks, the demoralized doctors were left shaken by their failure to control the disease and hesitant to question the health-related decisions of their line-officer superiors. The result was that over one-quarter of American Soldiers were infected with influenza during the war, and over 50,000 died. Byerly maintains that the influenza virus directly hindered the AEF's war effort by taking Soldiers out of training and overburdening the Army's already overtaxed medical, transportation, and replacement systems.

One of the more contentious elements of *Fever of War* is Byerly's claim that Army doctors and military and political leaders covered up their clumsy handling of the epidemic by minimizing or camouflaging the effects of the influenza outbreak in their historical writings on the war. Although Byerly overstates the degree that the influenza epidemic was erased from the public and military consciousness, she still offers an interesting and provocative interpretation of the creation of historical memory. Despite this minor reservation, *Fever of War* is an important work.

The book should be read by military, medical, or government officials involved in planning or executing the Nation's response to biological-weapons attacks or public-health disasters. In this era of the threats of anthrax, smallpox, SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), and bird flu, are we any less assured of our ability to conquer disease than was the generation of 1918? Perhaps Byerly's account of the great influenza pandemic is

a clarion call to wake us from our own hubris.

**LTC Richard S. Faulkner, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**SHAME AND ENDURANCE:
The Untold Story of the Chiricahua Apache Prisoners of War,**
H. Henrietta Stockel, University of Arizona Press, Tuscon, 2004, 200 pages, \$35.00.

In a remarkably well-written epilogue to the exploits of the Apache war chief Geronimo and his tribal followers, H. Henrietta Stockel brings the decline and fall of the tribe to life in a vein seldom explored in historical annals.

The Chiricahua, one of seven tribes of the Apache Nation, were considered at the time to be the most violent and dangerous of all Native Americans on the frontier and were pursued relentlessly in the mountainous regions of New Mexico and Arizona.

After surrendering to the Army in 1866, the Apache warriors and their families were relocated from their tribal homelands to St. Petersburg, Florida. In 1887, they were sent to southeast Alabama. There, within 8 years, nearly half of them perished from diseases to which they had no immunity.

Many of the children were taken from their families to be educated at the Indian school at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, despite repeated assurances from the government that this would not occur. In 1894, after years of pressure and lobbying efforts from Indian rights activists, the 260 surviving Chiricahua prisoners were relocated to Oklahoma.

Shame and Endurance is more than a tale of the tragic plight of the Chiricahua; it represents the most raw, most comprehensive account of the 27-year imprisonment of a proud people and the unforgivable policies that plagued their postsurrender existence.

Stockel, cofounder and former executive director of the Albuquerque Indian Center, is the author of seven previous books on Native American society and culture. She currently teaches courses on the ethnohistory of the Chiricahua Apaches at Cochise College in Sierra Vista, Arizona. Readers will find Stockel's prose to be vividly descriptive, her content compelling, and the book as informative as it is gripping.

**MAJ Steve Leonard, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE LONGEST BATTLE: September 1944 to February 1945 from Aachen to the Roer and Across, Harry Yeide, Zenith Press, St. Paul, MN, 2005, 304 pages, \$24.95.

Harry Yeide, noted international affairs analyst in political, security, and military issues, details the struggle the Allied and Axis forces faced in the critical Roer River Campaign from September 1944 to February 1945. *The Longest Battle* is a comprehensive account of the strategic decisions, small unit actions, intense combat, and catastrophic losses Allied forces endured as they fought their way into the German heartland.

The book uses personal diaries, after-action reports, and unit histories to develop the history of this epic little-known struggle. The book is more than a narrative of the events during this campaign; it integrates the personal triumphs and tragedies of individual Soldiers and their leaders as they fight and eventually win the struggle.

For today's warriors, the Roer River Campaign is an outstanding example of what intense warfare in complex, difficult terrain involves while fighting an extremely capable enemy. The Allied victory was the result of the courage, determination, and skill of individual Soldiers. This book is an outstanding tribute to their efforts.

**MAJ Jeffrey L. LaFace, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**